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Non-technical summary 
During the last two decades, the issue of international cooperation in climate protection has 
received increasing attention in economic research. The main focus has been on the 
underlying economic incentives for sovereign states to reach international environmental 
agreements. Besides the fundamental incentive problems of international cooperation, climate 
change policy has an important political economy dimension. National climate protection 
targets have to be politically acceptable to the domestic constituency. Moreover, even without 
international and national climate policies, individuals reduce CO2 emissions and voluntarily 
contribute to the global public good climate protection via carbon offsets. An empirical 
evaluation of the demand for carbon offsets and the people’s willingness to pay (WTP) for 
climate protection is thus crucial for assessing the prospects of climate change mitigation. 
Essentially, two methods for measuring the WTP for a particular good are available: First, one 
can infer the WTP from observing some economic transactions, i.e. the so-called revealed 
preferences approach. Second, one can ask people what they are willing to spend on some 
amount of a particular good or what quantity they are willing to purchase at a given price. 
This method is known as the stated preferences approach. Against the background of climate 
mitigation policies, all studies in the past that tried to measure WTP are varieties of the stated 
preferences approach. Thus, so far the WTP for climate protection has been derived from 
hypothetical decision situations only. 
This study aims at eliciting the participants’ real WTP for climate protection with the revealed 
preference approach. We conducted an experiment where people faced the opportunity to buy 
allowances from the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The sample consisted 
of 202 individuals from the residential population of Mannheim, Germany. Participants of the 
experiment received € 40 and obtained information about (i) climate change and its effects on 
environment and human society and (ii) the EU ETS. Five prices were shown to each 
participant. The participants then indicated which quantity of permits they would like to buy 
for each price. After the experiment, one of the five prices was randomly selected and 
transactions were conducted accordingly. This method was chosen to guarantee incentive-
compatibility and to implement a decision situation which is familiar to consumers since they 
have to state their demand at a given price. Purchased allowances were withdrawn from the 
EU ETS. From the observed price-quantity-combinations we derived participants’ demand 
and the corresponding WTP. The experiment consisted of two treatments “Baseline” and 
“Reputation”. In the latter, subjects knew in advance that they could obtain a certificate, 
verifying the purchased amounts. 
The main result is that WTP for carbon reduction is very low: It amounts to approximately 
€ 12 per ton of CO2. Compared to the figures previously reported by stated preference studies 
on the WTP for climate protection this amount is fairly small. Moreover, the median WTP for 
our sample is zero. With respect to the treatment variable (certification of CO2 reduction), we 
find a positive reputation effect, i.e. the quantity climate protection demanded in the 
reputation treatment was significantly higher compared to the baseline treatment. The analysis 
of data on socio-economic variables as well as of attitudes towards global warming shows a 
negative age-effect and a positive effect of the formal educational level. An additional 
determinant of demand for climate protection is the preference for political parties: voters of 
the Green Party buy more permits. 
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Obwohl der Klimaschutz seit Jahren mit hoher Priorität auf der politischen Agenda steht, ist 
die Höhe der realen Zahlungsbereitschaft für das globale Gut Klimaschutz weitestgehend 
unbekannt. Die reale Zahlungsbereitschaft für Klimaschutz stellt aber eine zentrale Größe dar, 
wenn es um die Bereitschaft eines Landes geht, sich zu bindenden Emissionsreduktionen zu 
verpflichten. Damit ein Land Vermeidungsaktivitäten unternimmt, die zumindest kurz- und 
mittelfristig signifikante Kosten verursachen, muss eine hinreichend hohe Zahlungs-
bereitschaft in der Bevölkerung existieren. Auch für freiwillige private Aktivitäten im 
Klimaschutz ist eine positive Zahlungsbereitschaft notwendig. 
Wie hoch die Zahlungsbereitschaft für Klimaschutz ist, kann letztlich nur empirisch ermittelt 
werden. Grundsätzlich gibt es zwei Methoden zur Ermittlung der Zahlungsbereitschaft für ein 
Gut. Erstens, die Zahlungsbereitschaft kann aus einer realen ökonomischen Transaktion 
abgeleitet werden. Zweitens, man kann Menschen fragen, was sie unter bestimmten 
Bedingungen für das Gut zu zahlen bereit sind. Alle verfügbaren Studien zur Zahlungs-
bereitschaft für Klimaschutz nutzen solche Befragungen. Es wird somit die hypothetische 
Zahlungsbereitschaft für Klimaschutz erhoben. 
In dieser experimentellen Studie wird erstmals die reale Nachfrage nach Klimaschutz ermittelt 
und damit zugleich die reale Zahlungsbereitschaft für Klimaschutz erhoben. Auf Grund der 
Existenz des Europäischen Emissionshandels für Kohlendioxid (CO2) ist es möglich, direkt 
die reale Nachfrage für die Stilllegung von CO2-Zertifikaten unter kontrollierten Bedingungen 
zu erheben. An der hier vorgestellten Studie nahmen 202 Mannheimer Bürger im Alter von 
18 bis 75 Jahren teil. Die Teilnehmer erhielten eine Aufwandsentschädigung in Höhe von 
40 €, wurden über den Klimawandel und die Wirkungsweise des Emissionshandels informiert 
und konnten schließlich – freiwillig und anonym – CO2-Zertifikate kaufen. Jeder Teilnehmer 
konnte für fünf verschiedene Preise die individuelle Nachfrage nach Zertifikaten angeben, 
wobei schließlich ein Preis als bindend ausgelost wurde. Der verwendete Mechanismus zur 
Ermittlung der Nachfrage ist anreizkompatibel, d.h., jeder Teilnehmer hatte einen Anreiz, 
seine tatsächliche individuelle Nachfrage anzugeben. Die an die Teilnehmer verkauften 
Zertifikate wurden erworben und stillgelegt. Damit wurde die Gesamtmenge aller zur 
Verfügung stehenden Zertifikate im Emissionshandel exakt um diese Menge reduziert, d.h., es 
wurde ein realer Beitrag zum Klimaschutz geleistet. 
Insgesamt sind 62 % der nachgefragten Mengen Null, so dass der Median der realen 
Zahlungsbereitschaft Null ist. Das arithmetische Mittel der realen Zahlungsbereitschaft 
beträgt hingegen ca. 12 € pro Tonne CO2. Ältere Teilnehmer kaufen deutlich weniger 
Zertifikate als jüngere. Dagegen kaufen Teilnehmer mit höherem Bildungsniveau und Wähler 
der Grünen deutlich mehr Zertifikate. Darüber hinaus haben Teilnehmer, deren Kauf-
entscheidung beurkundet wird, eine höhere Nachfrage nach Klimaschutz. 
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Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the real demand for climate protection. For this 
purpose we conducted a framed field experiment with a sample of the residential population 
in Mannheim, Germany. Participants were endowed with € 40 and given the opportunity to 
contribute to climate protection by purchasing European Union Allowances. Purchased 
allowances were withdrawn from the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). While 
the median willingness to pay (WTP) for climate protection is zero the mean WTP is 
approximately € 12/tCO2. We analyse determinants of the observed individual demand 
behaviour and discuss the potential consequences, which result from the remarkably low WTP 
and its distribution for German climate policy. 
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1 Introduction 
During the last two decades, the issue of international cooperation in climate protection has 
received increasing attention in economic research. The main focus has been on the 
underlying economic incentives for sovereign states to reach international environmental 
agreements. Since climate protection is a problem of providing a global public good, it is 
faced with severe incentive problems for governments that try to maximise their net economic 
benefits. The game-theoretical literature has provided important insights into the difficulties 
of establishing effective and efficient cooperation on the provision of climate protection (see 
Finus 2001 for an overview). 
Beyond the fundamental incentive problems of international cooperation, climate change 
policy has an important political economy dimension. National climate protection targets have 
to be politically acceptable to the domestic constituency. In the standard political economy 
approach, any government is motivated by the objective of maximizing its political income, 
i.e. the probability of being re-elected. In order to be re-elected, the government must consider 
the preferences of the pivotal voter, who can be approximated by the median voter in a 
democracy. Thus, the national median voter imposes a restriction on what would be 
acceptable to a government in international environmental negotiations. Ultimately, one 
would expect a government only to enter into agreements that are acceptable to the median 
voter. From a political economy point of view, thus, the median voter’s willingness to pay 
(WTP) for environmental protection determines the outcome of international environmental 
negotiations. Surprisingly, this fact has been widely ignored (one notable exception is 
Congleton 1992). Moreover, even without international and national climate policies, 
individuals reduce CO2 emissions and contribute voluntarily to the global public good (see 
Hamilton et al. 2008 for an overview of voluntary carbon markets). These carbon offsets are 
analysed theoretically by Kotchen (2009) and Gans and Groves (2010). An empirical 
evaluation of the demand for carbon offsets and the people’s WTP for climate protection is 
thus crucial for evaluating the prospects of climate change mitigation. 
Essentially, two methods for measuring the WTP for a particular good are available: First, one 
can infer the WTP from observing some economic transaction, i.e. the so-called revealed 
preferences approach. Second, one could ask people what they would be willing to spend for 
some amount of the good, or what quantity they would be willing to purchase at a given price. 
This method is known as stated preferences approach. Against the background of climate 
4 
mitigation policies, all studies in the past that tried to measure WTP are varieties of the stated 
preferences approach. Due to the hypothetical character of the decision situation given in this 
approach (Shogren 2005, Murphy et al. 2005), the reliance on stated preferences only is 
surprising. Meanwhile, however, the revealed preference approach can be used as a 
complementary method to observe preferences for climate protection: Since 2005, the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has been in place. This enables researchers to 
offer the purchase of emissions allowances from the EU-market and in turn directly observe 
the demand for climate protection or respectively the WTP. Our paper follows this approach. 
We conducted a framed field experiment (see Harrison and List 2004 for a classification of 
experiments) in which people were given the opportunity to buy European Union Allowances 
(EUAs) from the EU ETS. Participants of our experiment received € 40. To induce the 
demand for climate protection the following method was applied: Five prices were shown to 
each participant. The participants then indicated which quantity of permits they would like to 
buy for each price. After the experiment, one of the five prices was randomly selected and 
transactions were conducted accordingly. This method was chosen to guarantee incentive-
compatibility and to implement a decision situation which is familiar to consumers since they 
have to state their demand at a given price. Purchased allowances were withdrawn from the 
EU ETS. From the price-quantity-observations we derived participants’ demand and the 
corresponding WTP. Our experiment consisted of two treatments “Baseline” and 
“Reputation”. In the latter, subjects knew in advance that they could receive a certificate, 
verifying the purchased amounts. 
In the experiment, participants were given a real-life opportunity to contribute to climate 
protection – a global public good characterised by non-rivalry and non-excludability – by 
purchasing EUAs. It is evident that in the experiment described, individuals only have 
marginal impact on global emissions. Similarly, a small single country will also be unable to 
significantly influence global emission. This approach differs from hypothetical scenarios 
usually chosen in stated preference studies, in which participants are required to state their 
WTP under the assumption that climate protection will be collectively provided at a specific 
level (see Johnson and Nemet 2010 for a survey). Thus, in our study we elicit the real WTP 
for climate protection from a purely individual perspective without any assumption on 
collective action to provide emissions reduction. 
Our main result is that WTP for CO2 reduction is very low: It amounts to approximately € 12 
per ton of CO2 (tCO2). Compared to the figures previously reported by stated preference 
studies on the WTP for climate protection, this amount is relatively small. Moreover, the 
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median WTP for our sample is zero. With respect to the treatment variable (certification of 
CO2 reduction), we find a positive reputation effect, i.e. the quantity of climate protection 
demanded in the reputation treatment was significantly higher compared to the baseline 
treatment. The analysis of data on socio-economic variables as well as attitudes towards 
global warming showed a highly significant negative age-effect and a highly significant 
positive effect on the formal educational level. An additional determinant of demand for 
climate protection is the preference for political parties: voters of the Green Party buy more 
permits. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we briefly survey the literature on WTP for 
the mitigation of global warming. Section 3 explains our setting for measuring the demand for 
climate protection and thus the WTP for the reduction of one tCO2. In Section 4 states the 
results. Section 5 contains a discussion of our findings and concludes. 
2 Literature overview: A broad range of numbers 
Several stated preferences studies have recently explored the question of WTP for the 
mitigation of climate change. In general, there are two kinds of studies: (i) studies that 
estimate WTP as a total amount of money or percentage of income people are willing to give 
up per unit of time, e.g. within a year, in order to achieve a specific amount of mitigation, and 
(ii) studies that measure WTP as the amount of money people would be willing to spend on 
the reduction of one tCO2. In a recent survey, Johnson and Nemet (2010) surveyed 27 studies 
and achieved the result that the WTP for climate protection ranged between $22-$437 per 
household annually, with a mean of $167 and a median of $135. One major problem of 
comparing different WTP is the fact that the values were surveyed under different scenarios. 
Thus, the environmental goods evaluated in the WTP estimates vary extensively. Since in our 
study participants were offered EUAs, we refer to the second branch of studies which obtains 
WTP values measured in monetary units per tCO2. 
MacKerron et al. (2009) estimate the WTP for voluntary carbon offsets against an aviation-
related background. Participants of their study were asked what they would be willing to pay 
to offset their CO2 emissions during a hypothetical flight from New York to London. Using a 
dichotomous contingent valuation design, they estimated the mean WTP for the offset to be 
approximately £ 24/tCO2. In the second part of their study they try to identify the value of 
several co-benefits that might be associated with the reduction of CO2 (like, e.g. human 
development or conservation of biodiversity). Their main findings are that co-benefits are 
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positively valued and the total WTP for offsetting, including co-benefits, is higher compared 
to WTP for offsetting alone. In a similar study, Brouwer et al. (2007) asked passengers at the 
Amsterdam Schiphol airport for their WTP to reduce CO2 emissions caused by their flights. 
Brouwer et al. (2007) used a double bounded dichotomous CV design, enabling them to 
estimate WTP's upper and lower bounds. The mean WTP for the reduction of one tCO2 across 
all passengers amounts to € 25, with a remarkable geographic variety: Mean WTP for Asians 
is the lowest amount with a value of € 10/tCO2 while it is highest for Europeans (mean value 
of € 41/tCO2). The average WTP is well in line with figures reported in MacKerron et al. 
(2009). 
Achtnicht (2009) measures WTP for the reduction of CO2 using data from interviews with 
more than 600 potential car-buyers across Germany. The interviewees were presented a stated 
preference choice experiment consisting of hypothetical car types that differed in various 
characteristics like, e.g., price, propulsion technologies, fuel type and CO2 emissions per 
100 kilometres. Relying on a utility maximisation approach and employing a mixed-logit 
model, the WTP for the reduction of one tCO2 can be indirectly inferred from the choices 
revealed in the survey. On average the estimated WTP amounts to € 476/tCO2, which is much 
higher than the above mentioned estimates. 
Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2006) analysed the willingness to pay higher petrol taxes in order to 
avoid global warming among Harvard graduate students in law and public policy. They 
identified an average WTP of $ 0.79 per gallon of petrol and the median WTP to be $ 0.44. 
Since there is a constant relation between petrol input and CO2 emissions, these values can 
easily be converted into $ 89/tCO2 (mean) respectively $ 50/tCO2 (median).1 Given these 
values and assuming an annual average mileage of 10,000 miles, participants would in general 
be willing to spend approximately $ 1,500/year ($ 125/month). In addition, Viscusi and 
Zeckhauser ask for the WTP/income percentage ratio. They find that people are willing to 
spend 3 % of their personal annual income. This translates into $ 4,500/year, a much higher 
estimate than the value obtained from the petrol tax design. Viscusi and Zeckhauser attribute 
this difference to anchoring effects and prefer the estimate of willingness to pay derived from 
the specific petrol tax question instead of the results from the income vehicle. 
                                                 
1
 One liter of petrol leads to 2,333 gram of CO2. Of course, this calculation assumes that the WTP is not affected 
by the frame of the hypothetical decision situation. 
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This literature overview shows that WTP figures, in case of global warming, are highly 
diverse. WTP seems to be sensitive to a couple of factors, including the particular design of 
the study, e.g. which policy options participants face. Moreover, the number of topics 
included in a survey may influence participants’ valuation (the so-called “embedding effect”). 
And last but not least, also distributional consequences affect WTP. Cai et al. (2008) analyse 
the impact of distributional preferences on WTP for mitigation of climate change. Their 
results provide strong evidence that WTP is heavily affected by the distributional impacts of 
the relevant policy framework. This contradicts the (neo-)classical assumption that efficiency 
and equity concerns can be separated. In a similar study, Lee and Cameron (2008) also 
demonstrate eco-system impacts and burden sharing of mitigation efforts to have dramatic 
impacts on WTP. 
The existent estimates are exclusively based on the stated preferences approach. While there 
have been considerable efforts to improve its validity − cheap talk script (Cummings and 
Taylor 1999, Olar et al. 2007) and the use of certainty scales (Champ et al. 2005) are demand 
revealing techniques which try to minimise the hypothetical bias − decision making in the 
survey approach remains hypothetical. Therefore this study assesses the WTP for climate 
protection with a complementary method – a framed field experiment. 
3 The experiment 
The aim was to find out whether people would indeed be willing to spend the amounts stated 
for climate protection, if it was their own real money. To elicit the WTP for a reduction of 
atmospheric CO2 we used an experimental approach asking people to give up real money as 
an alternative to the survey approach. The EU ETS was employed as a vehicle and emission 
reductions were directly sold to the subjects. This section presents the procedures used in the 
experiment, first the mechanism to elicit the WTP for CO2 allowances followed by the 
descriptions of the concrete implementation. 
3.1 Mechanism design 
Experimental studies have applied a wide variety of incentive-compatible mechanisms to 
elicit the WTP for goods. In general, a mechanism is considered incentive-compatible if an 
individual’s dominant strategy is to behave in such a way that valuations are truthfully 
revealed. For example, the following incentive-compatible procedures were used in recent 
literature: the Vickrey 2nd price auction (e.g. Noussair et al. 2002, Hayes et al. 1995), the 
8 
random nth price auction (e.g. List 2003, Huffman et al. 2007), and the Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak (BDM) mechanism (e.g. Noussair et al. 2004, Lusk and Fox 2003). In our study, we 
decided to use a modification of the BDM mechanism (Becker et al. 1964), in order to elicit 
the real demand for climate protection. Each participant was confronted with five different 
prices ordered from high to low. Prices were randomly selected from a uniform distribution of 
prices in € 0.20 steps between € 0.20 and € 5.00.2 Each participant indicated the quantity she 
or he would be willing to buy at each of the five prices. Finally, one of the prices was 
randomly selected and the transaction was carried out at the corresponding price. Participants 
who did not wish to buy permits at a specific price indicated a quantity of zero. 
Selecting the mechanism to elicit individuals’ real demand, we had to account for the 
heterogeneity of the participants in the experiment. In particular, we had to ensure that the 
mechanism rules were comprehensible, also to people who were not familiar with the rather 
artificial decision situation in the experiment. For our experiment, the BDM mechanism 
seemed to be appropriate, since this mechanism is relatively simple and creates an individual 
demand function with five price-quantity-combinations. Moreover, the procedure of asking 
the participants for the quantity demanded at a given price we chose, corresponds to the 
participants’ everyday live decision situation. 
3.2 Implementation 
For the recruitment of participants, around 2,200 letters of invitation were randomly 
distributed in Mannheim city centre, Germany. The information that people received at this 
stage was that there would be a survey in which they could buy products and that they would 
receive a remuneration of € 40. Since several studies show that if people bid using windfall 
money they are likely to overstate their WTP (e.g. Cherry 2001, Cherry et al. 2002), it was 
already emphasised in the letter that the amount of € 40 was a remuneration for taking part in 
the study. By doing so participants should feel being entitled to the money. A relatively high 
remuneration was used in order to avoid underrepresentation of people with high opportunity 
costs of time. The experiment took place in March 2010 on the premises of the Centre for 
                                                 
2 The price range (between € 2/tCO2 and € 50/tCO2) was chosen according to observed and expected EUA 
prices. The average closing spot price of EUAs on the environmental trading exchange BlueNext was 
€ 12.87/tCO2 in March 2010. The impact assessment of the Climate change and renewable energy package 
estimated carbon prices in the range of € 30/tCO2 to € 39/tCO2 by 2020 (European Commission 2008). Most 
recent forecasts are between € 20/tCO2 and € 40/tCO2 for Phase 3 of the EU ETS (Thomson Reuters 2010, 
Barclays Capital 2010, Löschel et al. 2010). 
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European Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim, Germany. A total of 202 participants 
took part in the experiment. Each of the six sessions had 28 to 39 participants.3 At the 
beginning of each session, participants individually drew lots to determine their ID number 
(which was kept private). Afterwards, they received the remuneration of € 40 and the 
instructions.4 Finally, participants could chose a table. Participants were not allowed to talk to 
each other. If they had questions, the experimenter answered them privately. 
Experimental sessions lasted for about 60 to 75 minutes. At first, participants filled out an 
initial questionnaire enquiring about socio-economic characteristics and climate change. 
Then, the selling procedure was explained in the instructions. Participants additionally saw a 
first presentation of a concrete (but unrelated to CO2 permits) example of the BDM 
mechanism and had to fill out a short quiz that checked their understanding. After that, 
participants were given information about (i) climate change and its effects on the 
environment and human society, and (ii) the EU ETS. In the information about the EU ETS 
we put emphasis on the fact that buying and withdrawing permits actually reduces the EU 
emissions. Participants were reassured that all transactions would be carried out and that the 
final purchases and withdrawing of permits would be announced on the ZEW webpage. 
Finally, participants were informed that they had the opportunity to buy permits in 100 kg 
units with their own money and could therefore contribute to the overall reduction of CO2 
emissions. In order to make individual CO2 emissions more tangible participants saw a second 
presentation with three specific examples of activities resulting in emissions of 100 kg CO2.5 
Then each participant was given five different prices ordered from high to low. Each 
participant had to announce the quantity she or he would like to purchase. By doing so, the 
maximal expenditures were limited to € 40. The fact that all decisions were voluntary was 
stressed before this decision. Finally, participants filled out a second questionnaire answering 
questions about possible motives to contribute (or not to contribute) to climate protection. 
Afterwards, participants left the room one-by-one. Participants who had announced positive 
quantities had to draw lots to determine the price at which the transaction would take place. 
Each subject paid the corresponding amount of money and received the information where the 
                                                 
3
 The actual response rate, however, was higher than 9 % because during the registration we screened all 
applications according to gender and age, i.e. people from certain age groups that were already overrepresented 
in the sample were not allowed to take part. 
4
 See Annex II for the translated instructions. 
5
 We choose the following examples: (i) a 720 km drive with a VW Golf 1.4 TSI leads to 100 kg CO2, (ii) the 
electricity consumption of a two-person household in 19 days also leads to 100 kg CO2, and (iii) 100 kg CO2 are 
0.9 % of the annual average per capita CO2 emissions in Germany. 
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results of the study would be published at the ZEW webpage. After that, participants left the 
institute. All other participants had already left the institute directly after the second 
questionnaire. 
The total quantity of permits, 52.5 tons, was bought and directed to the DEHSt account 170-
34-34. The only purpose of the account is to delete permits at the end of the year. The whole 
process was made public. 
Our experiment contained one treatment variable. In order to analyse possible effects of 
reputation when contributing to the global public good a subset of participants (N = 67 of 
202) could receive a certificate. The certificate listed the name of the participant and the 
quantity bought. Furthermore, the procedure and the aim of the study were briefly described. 
Subjects were informed about the certificate in advance during the second presentation. 
4 Results 
In this section we present the results of the experiment. First, we briefly describe the pool of 
selected participants followed by the results of the first questionnaire on attitudes with regard 
to climate change. Second, we analyse the purchase decision and compute the average WTP 
for climate protection. The third part analyses the results of the second questionnaire on 
buying motives. Finally, the findings of regression models are presented in order to analyse 
the determinants of subjects’ demand for climate protection. 
4.1 Pool of participants and their attitudes towards climate change 
Before announcing their purchase decisions, participants answered a first questionnaire. The 
main purpose of this questionnaire was to collect data about socio-economic characteristics 
and the attitudes and experiences with respect to climate change. Tables 3 and 4 (see Annex I) 
present the participants’ socio-economic characteristics. Our subject pool covered all required 
age groups for men as well as for women. With respect to the variables 'age' and 'sex' our pool 
represented the residential population of Mannheim (StaLa BWL 2007). The hypothesis of 
equal relative frequencies for male and female age groups between the selected participants 
and the resident population cannot be rejected.6 Quite surprisingly, the fraction of voters with 
                                                 
6
 Chi-squared = 4.94, df = 3, p = 0.176 for male subjects and chi-squared = 4.75, df = 3, p = 0.192 for female 
subjects. There are four age groups: 18-24, 25-39, 40-64, and 65-75. 
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“green preferences” among our subjects was relatively high, since 23 % would vote for the 
Green Party. This figure is nearly twice as high as the proportion of votes that this party 
achieved in the last election of the state parliament in Baden-Wuerttemberg (in 2006: 
11.7 %).7 
Tables 5, 6 and 7 (Annex I) present participants’ attitudes and experiences with regard to 
climate change. With respect to the level of information about climate change, half of the 
participants were “averagely informed” (51 % of all subjects), and about one third was rather 
“well informed”. Besides, 52 % of the participants stated that media influence on their own 
perception of climate change was very strong or rather strong. Climate change matters: 52 % 
were “rather concerned” about climate change and about 12 % were “very concerned”. 
However, there were also participants who remained neutral (17 %) with respect to this issue 
or “rather not concerned” (13 %) or “not at all concerned” (4 %). Participants’ attitude 
differed with respect to the expectation of negative consequences caused by climate change 
for their own personal life: 48 % expected negative consequences, 52 % did not. Positive 
consequences caused by climate change were only expected by 8 %, 90 % did not expect 
positive effects. 
Among the participants there seemed to be awareness that intergenerational equity may be 
affected by climate change. While about 24 % stated that climate change posed a “rather 
serious or very serious threat” to them or their families, about 38 % stated that climate 
change posed such a threat to their children and about 84 % to future generations in general. 
Also intra-generational equity was an issue. About 34 % stated that climate change posed a 
“rather serious or very serious threat” to people in Germany, about 52 % stated that climate 
change posed such a threat to people in other industrialised countries and about 86 % 
indicated that climate change was a threat to people in developing countries. 
Being asked whether they had been personally affected by negative effects of climate change 
about 9 % indicated “yes”, only about 4 % confirmed that they had been affected positively 
by climate change. The relative majority of participants (41 %) thought that the impacts of 
climate change are already visible. About 39 % expected that the impacts will become visible 
within the next 50 years. The overwhelming majority (87 %) supported the statement that 
                                                 
7
 See http://www.landtagswahl-bw.de. Recent polls, however, indicate a higher fraction of votes (27 %) for the 
Green Party. See http://www.presseportal.de/pm/7169/1678447/swr_suedwestrundfunk (accessed on September 
8th 2010). 
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“there is still a need for commitment to fight climate change”. Only about 6 % disagreed with 
this statement. 
We also asked participants who should be responsible for measures against climate change. 
On the one hand, participants were convinced that their “personal behaviour has an influence 
on climate change”. About 70 % rather agreed or even fully agreed with this statement. Even 
more, about 74 % rather agreed or fully agreed with the statement that their behaviour to 
avoid climate change “can encourage others … to behave the same way”. On the other hand, 
83 % did not agree or rather did not agree with the statement that “the government is solely 
responsible for measures against climate change”. We also asked subjects how they would 
evaluate two popular CO2 abatement measures. About 66 % rather agreed or even fully agreed 
with the statement that “German citizen[s] should use as little electricity as possible” in order 
to mitigate climate change. In the same way about 78 % supported the statement that 
“German citizen[s] should use their car … as little as possible” in order to mitigate climate 
change. 
4.2 Quantity demanded and willingness to pay for climate protection 
In this section, we analyse participants’ bidding behaviour. As mentioned before, five prices 
ranging from € 0.20 to € 5.00 in € 0.20 steps were randomly selected and all decisions could 
have led to real purchases. Therefore, the number of observations is 1010. Table 1 
summarizes the bidding behaviour. At all prices the median quantity (in 100 kg CO2) 
purchased is zero. The arithmetic mean of the quantity purchased is 2.83, i.e. 283 kg CO2, 
indicating the existence of outliers on the right tail of the quantity distribution. With 
decreasing prices on average more permits are purchased. For the highest prices (price p in 
€Cent), i.e. the price interval 500420 ≤≤ p , the mean quantity amounts to 0.59 only. For the 
lowest prices, i.e. the price interval 10020 ≤≤ p , the mean quantity purchased amounts to 
8.41, i.e. 841 kg CO2. 
13 
Table 1: Summary of bidding behaviour 
 Units (in 100 kg CO2) 
Price range (in €Cent) ↓ Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. 
500420 ≤≤ p  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.50 9.00 
400320 ≤≤ p  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.76 1.00 11.00 
300220 ≤≤ p  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.12 1.00 14.00 
200120 ≤≤ p  0.00 0.00 0.00 3.33 5.00 28.00 
10020 ≤≤ p  0.00 0.00 1.00 8.41 10.00 100.00 
All prices (in €Cent) ↓       
50020 ≤≤ p  0.00 0.00 0.00 2.83 2.00 100.00 
 
 
The figures in Table 1 suggest a downward-sloping demand curve for climate protection, 
which will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.4. Figure 1 depicts the cumulated density 
function for quantities (in units of 100 kg CO2, on the left side) and for expenditures (in 
€Cent, on the right side).8 Furthermore, the values for minimum, 1st quartile, median, mean, 
standard deviation (SD), 3rd quartile and maximum are indicated. Both distributions are 
characterised by a high frequency of observations on the left tail. With respect to quantities, a 
total of 75 % were below or equal to 2 units, i.e. 200 kg CO2. The maximum quantity 
demanded is 100 units. A slightly less extreme ratio holds for the expenditure: 75 % are below 
or equal to €Cent 400, the maximum is €Cent 4,000, i.e. a few individuals were willing to 
spend all their remuneration on climate protection. Furthermore, 62 % of all quantities (and 
therefore also of all expenditures) are zero, i.e. across the entire price range a majority of 
individuals did not purchased emission reductions at all. Thus, the median values for 
quantities and expenditures are zero, but the mean values are positive (the mean quantity is 
2.83 units of 100 kg, the mean expenditure is 336.59 €Cent). 
                                                 
8
 Revenues are equivalent to subjects’ expenditures. 
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Figure 1: Cumulated density function for quantities (left) and expenditures (right) 
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From the data above we can compute the mean WTP for climate protection by dividing the 
mean expenditure (€Cent 336.59) by the mean quantity demanded (2.83 units of 100 kg CO2). 
This leads to the mean WTP of €Cent 118.91 for one unit of 100 kg CO2, i.e. € 11.89/tCO2. 
The median WTP is zero. 
Figure 2: Lorenz curve for quantities and expenditures 
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The Lorenz curve in Figure 2 confirms the impression that quantities as well as expenditures 
are highly concentrated. The highest 20 % of all quantities (expenditures) contribute to 
approximately 91 % (85 %) of the sum of all quantities (expenditures). Thus, the data show a 
very dichotomous distribution of two types: a majority of participants with a zero WTP and 
few individuals who contribute significantly to climate protection. 
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Directly after the purchase decision participants were asked to guess the current market price 
for one unit CO2 (= 100 kg CO2). On average, participants overestimated the CO2 price (see 
Table 8 in Annex I). In March 2010, the average closing spot price of the European Union 
Allowances on the environmental trading exchange BlueNext was € 12.87/tCO2. One third 
believed that the price for one unit ranges between € 2 and € 10 per 100 kg CO2. Only 12 % 
had correct expectations with respect to the market price, i.e. they estimated the CO2 prices to 
be between € 1 and € 2 per 100 kg CO2. However, almost all individuals were rather unsure 
about their price estimation, two thirds of subjects guessed when they were asked for their 
price estimates. 
4.3 Participants’ motives to buy or to refuse to buy 
Directly after the purchasing decision participants were requested to answer questions about 
their buying motives. The questions were structured according to potential arguments to 
contribute to the global public good climate protection (see Tables 9 and 10 in Annex I). 
Being asked why they would like to contribute, the absolute majority stated that their 
contribution did not depend on other people's choices or decisions: 84 % agreed to the 
statement “I want to contribute to climate protection – regardless what others do”.9 
Reciprocity as a motive for contributions was less important. Only 55 % stated that they 
would like to contribute because of the expectation that others would follow this example. 
Intra-generational equity was another important motive in the public debate on climate 
change. In our sample, the participants confirmed this assumption: 74 % of the participants 
contributed “because especially people in poor countries will suffer from the consequences of 
climate change and [I] they want to do something against it”. However, the argument that 
industrialised countries, among them Germany, caused climate change and thus people would 
be obliged to contribute more to climate protection received less affirmation (64 %). Besides 
intra-generational equity also intergenerational equity was an issue: 82 % bought permits 
because future generations will suffer from climate change and the participants wanted to do 
something against it. The protection of flora and fauna as a buying motive was important for 
76 % of the participants. 
                                                 
9
 If not otherwise mentioned, we aggregate the observations for “rather applicable” and “absolutely 
applicable” (Tables 9, 10 and 11 in Annex I) in this section. 
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Other motives to purchase climate protection were, however, less important: “the government 
is not doing enough against climate change” (49 % approval), “it is my moral obligation” 
(49 %) and “because it is important to protect the creation” (44 %). According to the 
answers, social pressure was not a motive for buying. Being asked whether they bought 
“because [my] their environment (family, friends, colleagues) expect [me] them to”, only 
11 % agreed. For 45 % this motive was irrelevant. Due to the fact that there was direct contact 
to the ZEW staff during the experiment, participants might have been felt pushed to buy. 
However, considering the received answers this was rather not the motive. Being asked 
whether they “buy permits, because the organizers of this event expect [me] them to” 64 % of 
subjects stated that this statement did absolutely not hold for them. 
In our experiment, 83 of 202 participants, i.e. 41 %, did not buy at any price. We enquired 
about possible motives not to buy and looked at the approval rates afterwards (Table 11 in 
Annex I).10 The majority of (52 %) who did not buy any permit stated that “they [I] do not 
think their [my] buying of permits will actually reduce emissions in Europe”. This motive is 
well-known from the standard economic model of the homo oeconomicus. As the effect of the 
individual contribution to climate protection is costly but has negligible effects on climate 
protection, it is a dominant strategy not to contribute. Furthermore, 41 % of those participants 
who refused to buy believe that “the market for permits does not work. We need prohibitions 
and commands”. That means that a relative majority seemed to mistrust emission trading as 
such. They are less concerned about technical problems with measurement and control of CO2 
emissions. Only 18 % stated that they did not buy permits because “emissions … [can’t] 
actually be measured and controlled”. Another motive for not buying was that participants 
already behaved in a climate conscious way. For 42 % this was a relevant motive not to buy 
permits. Also distributional concerns seem to be a reason for subjects not to buy permits 
although the interpretation of answers is ambiguous here. On the one hand 36 % refused to 
buy “because emissions trading anyhow suits the interests of the large scale industry only”. 
On the other hand only 22 % refused to buy permits because companies had received them for 
free and the latter would thus be subsidised. Remarkably, only for 20 % the argument 
“emissions trading is principally unethical” was a motive not to buy. Again, responses show 
that participants trusted the ZEW. Only 7 % did not buy permits because they did not trust 
                                                 
10
 We implemented these questions after the first session. Subjects of the first session who didn’t buy were 
counted as “no answer”. 
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ZEW. On the contrary this motive not to buy was absolutely not applicable for 35 % of 
participants. 
4.4 Regression models 
In order to analyse determinants of individual demand behaviour, we provide regression 
estimates of the general form ),(loglog ZPfQ = . Qlog  is the natural log of the demanded 
quantity + 1, Plog  is the natural log of the price and Z is a vector of other independent 
variables. Since the dependent variable is censored from below, we use tobit regressions. 
Table 2 lists three different models to explain Qlog . The first model is simply an estimate for 
the demand function )(loglog PfQ = . The estimated coefficient ( 363.0− ) is negative and 
above –1, thus indicating a negatively sloped and inelastic demand function. The second 
model incorporates the price, different socio-economic characteristics and reputation as 
explanatory variables. The third model incorporates participants’ attitudes towards climate 
change. Dummy variables are indicated with a “D”. 
The significant regression results (at least p < 0.1) for the socio-economic variables can be 
summarised as follows. Males have a higher demand for climate protection than females. 
Older persons buy fewer permits than younger people. The individual income positively 
influences the willingness to contribute to climate protection. Participants with a university 
degree buy more permits. Voters of the Green Party also contribute more to climate 
protection. Furthermore, participants in the reputation treatment buy more permits than 
subjects in the no reputation treatment. In line with socio-economic variables several attitudes 
towards climate change influence the willingness to contribute to climate protection. 
Participants who stated that media influence on their own perception of climate change was 
rather strong bought more permits. The same holds for participants who are at least “rather 
strong” concerned about impacts of climate change. Finally, participants who believe that 
personal activity for climate protection is rather important have a stronger demand for climate 
protection. 
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Table 2: Tobit regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
independent variables ↓ log Q log Q log Q 
log P -0.363*** -0.373*** -0.363*** 
 (10.91) (11.88) (12.29) 
male_D  0.120** 0.159*** 
  (2.23) (2.93) 
age  -0.014*** -0.013*** 
  (7.36) (7.32) 
income  0.051*** 0.037** 
  (2.97) (2.26) 
religion_D  -0.001 -0.019 
  (0.02) (0.36) 
child_D  0.059 0.065 
  (0.86) (0.97) 
edu_uni_D  0.165*** 0.195*** 
  (2.88) (3.50) 
party_green_D  0.269*** 0.181*** 
  (4.03) (2.92) 
reputation_D  0.163*** 0.113* 
  (2.70) (1.95) 
info_cc_D   -0.062 
   (1.17) 
media_infl_D   0.123** 
   (2.37) 
concerns_cc_D   0.103* 
   (1.78) 
pers_activ_D   0.352*** 
   (6.05) 
enc_other_D   0.046 
   (0.70) 
gov_resp_D   -0.108 
   (1.24) 
Constant 1.720*** 1.994*** 1.552*** 
 (9.99) (10.29) (8.15) 
Observations 1010 960 960 
Pseudo R-squared 0.05 0.10 0.13 
Notes: 
(i) *, **, *** significance at 10 %, 5 %, 1 %. Coefficients indicate marginal effects on unconditional expected 
value. Absolute value of z statistics are in parentheses. 
(ii) Definition of variables: log Q: natural log of quantity in units of 100 kg demanded + 1; log P: natural log of 
price in €Cent; male_D: 1 (0) if male (female), age: age in years; income: 1 if household income < 1 k€, 2 if 
1 k€ ≤  income < 2 k€, 3 if 2 k€ ≤  income < 3 k€, 4 if 3 k€ ≤  income < 4 k€, 5 if 4 k€ ≤  income < 5 k€, 6 if 
income ≥  5 k€; religion_D: 1 (0) if religious (not religious); child_D: 1 (0) if at least one child (no children); 
edu_uni_D: 1 (0) if university education (other); party_green_D: 1 (0) if green voter (other); reputation_D: 1 
(0) if treatment reputation (other); info_cc_good_D: 1 (0) if information about climate change is at least good 
(other); media_infl_D: 1 (0) if media influence on the perception of climate change is at least rather strong 
(other); concerns_cc_D: 1 (0) if concerns about climate change are rather strong (other); pers_activ_D: 1 (0) if 
personal activity for climate protection is rather important (other); enc_other_D: 1 (0) if encouraging others for 
climate protection is rather important (other); gov_resp_D: 1 (0) if governmental responsibility for climate 
protection is rather important (other). 
 
In general, the statistically significant effects of independent variables on the quantity 
demanded are only small in their magnitudes. There are, however, some interesting 
differences in the quantitative effects. According to the estimated coefficient in model (3), 
which shows the marginal effect of the independent variable (“var”) on the unconditional 
expected value of the dependent variable (“ Qlog ”), men, on average purchase 0.17 units more 
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than women.11 If we compare a 20-year-old participant with a 70-year-old, the older 
participant buys on average 0.92 units less. The effect of income can be computed in a similar 
way. If we take a participant with an income between € 5,000 and € 6,000 she or he on 
average purchases 0.20 units more compared to participants with an income below € 1,000. 
The remaining variables with statistically significant effects are dummy variables and their 
quantitative effect on the demand can be computed accordingly. The strongest effect is 
generated by participants who believe that personal activity for climate protection is rather 
important. Those participants on average demand 0.42 units more. The effect of reputation, 
significant at the 10 %-level, has only a small effect. Participants in the reputation treatment 
on average buy 0.20 units more. 
5 Discussion and conclusion 
Several studies on the WTP for climate protection were written in the last decade. The 
existing studies are characterised by various definitions of the good to be valued. Moreover, 
the studies exclusively rely on surveys and use hypothetical scenarios to elicit stated 
preferences. The payment mechanisms employed range from household costs in general to 
specific increases for energy or fuel. The studies analyse a broad range of explanatory 
variables such as climate awareness, environmental values, risk perception, uncertainty and 
perceived fairness. Estimates of annual WTP to pay for households and WTP per tCO2 
reduction vary enormously due to the differences described above, but also because of 
attitudes, socio-economic characteristics and geography. 
We have complemented existing studies on the WTP in several aspects: First, we confront 
subjects with a real decision situation in which they can contribute to climate protection. 
Thereby, we elicit the real WTP for climate protection from a purely individual perspective 
without any assumption on collective action to provide emissions reduction. Second, we make 
use of an established mechanism for climate protection, the EU ETS. Allowances purchased 
by our participants were bought and withdrawn from the EU ETS. We found that WTP is 
higher with increasing levels of income, education, with greener political views and concerns 
about severe impacts of climate change. WTP for climate protection decreases with age and is 
lower for females than for males. There is also a positive reputation effect. Our analysis also 
showed a very dichotomous distribution of two types: a majority of subjects with a very low 
                                                 
11
 Computed as follows: 17.01demandedquantity 17.1159.0varlog =−=⇔=⇔=∆∆ QQQ  units. 
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WTP and few individuals who would spend almost everything on climate protection. Without 
doubt, our most important results are the overall low average WTP per tCO2 and the zero 
median WTP for climate protection. If people are asked to give up real money, WTP per tCO2 
for climate protection is obviously much lower than in existing hypothetical studies. 
This is indeed an “inconvenient truth” from a political economy perspective: There seems to 
be no political majority for substantial, i.e. costly climate policy. A majority of voters is not 
willing to bear significant costs in order to mitigate climate change. These results are quite 
remarkable given the fact that our study was conducted in Germany, a high income country, 
where concerns about climate change have existed for a long time. One might infer that WTP 
for climate protection in countries with lower income, less information and less concern 
among the public will be even lower (Carlsson et al. 2010 show this in a multiple country 
study for China, Sweden and the US). Thus, it seems plausible to assume that our low 
estimate of WTP is indeed an upper bound for WTP in other countries. On the other hand, an 
overwhelming majority of participants is concerned about the impacts of climate change and 
wants policy makers to do something against global warming because future generations or 
poor countries will suffer. Moreover, most participants seem to be willing to contribute 
unconditionally to climate mitigation, i.e. even without cooperative givings by others. This 
display of good will, however, does not result in a corresponding higher WTP, but it might 
help to explain the existing deficiencies in international climate agreements. The presumably 
overall low WTP for climate protection might to some extent explain why the Kyoto Protocol 
– so far the only existing international climate agreement – reduced to a mere symbolic policy 
(see e.g. Böhringer and Vogt 2004, Endres et al. 2000). 
However, the median voter model can only partly explain what happens in real-life. While 
most countries, which ratified the Kyoto Protocol, are far away from reaching their reduction 
targets – which is by and large in line with the symbolic policy conjecture derived from low 
WTP – very few countries12 like Germany enacted costly climate policies in the past and 
substantially reduced their CO2 emissions. This observation is not in line with the conclusions 
from the median voter model in combination with our empirical low estimate of WTP. Other 
factors like the impact of green pressure groups might explain why German climate policy 
                                                 
12
 To be precise, besides Germany it is only Great Britain which is on track with its Kyoto obligation. 
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tended to deviate from the median voter outcome in the past.13 However, a thorough analysis 
and discussion of these issues is well beyond the scope of this paper. 
                                                 
13
 For the impact of interest groups on EU climate policy see Michaelowa (1998). 
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Annex I: Descriptive statistics of questionnaires 
Table 3: Socio-economic characteristics of participants – part I 
# Variable State Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
1 Gender Male 
Female 
No answer 
99 
102 
1 
49.00 
50.50 
0.50 
2 Age 18 – 25 
26 – 35 
36 – 45 
46 – 55 
56 – 65 
66 – 75 
No answer 
30 
53 
27 
38 
27 
17 
10 
14.85 
26.24 
13.37 
18.81 
13.37 
8.42 
4.95 
3 Family status Married 
Unmarried with partner 
Single 
Other 
No answer 
55 
61 
62 
23 
1 
27.23 
30.20 
30.69 
11.39 
0.50 
4 Children 
in household 
1 
2 
3 
4 
No 
No answer 
18 
16 
7 
2 
152 
7 
8.91 
7.92 
3.47 
0.99 
75.25 
3.47 
5 Education University 
Grammar school 
Intermediate school 
Secondary school 
No graduation 
No answer 
94 
47 
34 
22 
2 
3 
46.53 
23.27 
16.83 
10.89 
0.99 
1.49 
6 Nationality German 
Turkish 
Russian 
Italian 
Other 
No answer 
170 
6 
1 
2 
21 
2 
84.16 
2.97 
0.50 
0.99 
10.40 
0.99 
7 Household 
net income 
Less than € 1,000 
€ 1,000 - € 2,000 
€ 2,000 - € 3,000 
€ 3,000 - € 4,000 
€ 4,000 - € 5,000 
More than € 5,000 
No answer 
49 
71 
38 
16 
10 
8 
10 
24.26 
35.15 
18.81 
7.92 
4.95 
3.96 
4.95 
8 Religion Yes 
No 
No answer 
125 
76 
1 
61.88 
37.62 
0.50 
  Σ  202 100.00 
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Table 4: Socio-economic characteristics of participants – part II 
# Variable State Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
9 Voting 
behavior 
Christian Democratic / Christian Social Union 
Social Democratic Party 
Green Party 
Free Liberal Party 
Left Party 
Others 
Nonvoter 
No answer 
33 
38 
47 
19 
12 
6 
24 
18 
16.34 
18.81 
23.27 
9.41 
5.94 
2.97 
11.88 
8.91 
10 Profession Employee 
Worker 
Public Officer 
Self-employed 
Apprentice / Trainee 
Pupil 
Student / doctoral candidate 
Retiree 
Unemployed 
Others 
No answer 
77 
4 
11 
15 
0 
2 
38 
30 
13 
9 
3 
38.12 
1.98 
5.45 
7.43 
0.00 
0.99 
18.81 
14.85 
6.44 
4.46 
1.49 
11 Member of an 
environmental 
organisation 
Yes 
No 
No answer 
13 
185 
4 
6.44 
91.58 
1.98 
  
Σ
 202 100.00 
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Table 5: Attitudes and experiences with respect to climate change – part I 
# Variable State Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
12 Please rate your level of 
information regarding climate 
change. I am… 
Very poorly informed 
Rather poorly informed 
Averagely informed 
Rather well informed 
Very well informed 
No answer 
2 
14 
104 
66 
14 
2 
0.99 
6.93 
51.49 
32.67 
6.93 
0.99 
13 To what extent are you influenced 
by mass media regarding your 
perception of the consequences of 
climate change? 
Not at all influenced 
Rather not influenced 
Neutral 
Rather strong influenced 
Very strong influenced 
No answer 
4 
21 
69 
92 
14 
2 
1.98 
10.40 
34.16 
45.54 
6.93 
0.99 
14 Are you concerned about climate 
change? 
Not at all concerned 
Rather not concerned 
Neutral 
Rather concerned 
Very concerned 
No answer 
9 
26 
34 
106 
25 
2 
4.46 
12.87 
16.83 
52.48 
12.38 
0.99 
15 Do you expect noticeable negative 
consequences of climate change 
for your personal life? 
Yes 
No 
No answer 
96 
104 
2 
47.52 
51.49 
0.99 
16 Do you expect noticeable positive 
consequences of climate change 
for your personal life? 
Yes 
No 
No answer 
16 
182 
4 
7.92 
90.10 
1.98 
17 To what extent do you think that 
climate change poses a serious 
threat to you and your family? 
No serious threat 
Rather no serious threat 
Neutral 
Rather serious threat 
Very serious threat 
No answer 
36 
52 
61 
45 
3 
5 
17.82 
25.74 
30.20 
22.28 
1.49 
2.48 
17 To what extent do you think that 
climate change poses a serious 
threat to your children (if 
applicable)? 
No serious threat 
Rather no serious threat 
Neutral 
Rather serious threat 
Very serious threat 
No answer 
9 
13 
28 
60 
16 
76 
4.46 
6.44 
13.86 
29.70 
7.92 
37.62 
17 To what extent do you think that 
climate change poses a serious 
threat to future generations in 
general? 
No serious threat 
Rather no serious threat 
Neutral 
Rather serious threat 
Very serious threat 
No answer 
5 
9 
16 
99 
70 
3 
2.48 
4.46 
7.92 
49.01 
34.65 
1.49 
17 To what extent do you think that 
climate change poses a serious 
threat to friends, acquaintances, 
colleagues? 
No serious threat 
Rather no serious threat 
Neutral 
Rather serious threat 
Very serious threat 
No answer 
24 
45 
70 
52 
5 
6 
11.88 
22.28 
34.65 
25.74 
2.48 
2.97 
  Σ  202 100.00 
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Table 6: Attitudes and experiences with respect to climate change – part II 
# Variable State Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
17 To what extent do you think that 
climate change poses a serious 
threat to people in Germany in 
general? 
No serious threat 
Rather no serious threat 
Neutral 
Rather serious threat 
Very serious threat 
No answer 
23 
37 
69 
60 
8 
5 
11.39 
18.32 
34.16 
29.70 
3.96 
2.48 
17 To what extent do you think that 
climate change poses a serious 
threat to people in other 
industrialized countries? 
No serious threat 
Rather no serious threat 
Neutral 
Rather serious threat 
Very serious threat 
No answer 
11 
30 
49 
80 
25 
7 
5.45 
14.85 
24.26 
39.60 
12.38 
3.47 
17 To what extent do you think that 
climate change poses a serious 
threat to people in developing 
countries? 
No serious threat 
Rather no serious threat 
Neutral 
Rather serious threat 
Very serious threat 
No answer 
4 
5 
13 
69 
105 
6 
1.98 
2.48 
6.44 
34.16 
51.98 
2.97 
18 Have you been personally affected 
by negative effects of climate 
change? 
Yes 
No 
No answer 
18 
181 
2 
8.91 
89.60 
0.99 
21 Have you been personally affected 
by positive effects of climate 
change? 
Yes 
No 
No answer 
8 
191 
3 
3.96 
94.55 
1.49 
24 When do you expect the impacts 
of climate change to become 
visible? 
Never 
In more than 100 years 
Within the next 100 years 
Within the next 50 years 
Within the next 10 years 
Already visible 
No answer 
6 
10 
16 
55 
23 
83 
9 
2.97 
4.95 
7.92 
27.23 
11.39 
41.09 
4.46 
25 Do you think that there still is a 
need for commitment to fight 
climate change? 
Yes 
No 
Don’t know 
No answer 
175 
13 
12 
2 
86.63 
6.44 
5.94 
0.99 
  Σ  202 100.00 
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Table 7: Attitudes and experiences with respect to climate change – part III 
# Variable State Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
26 To what extent do you agree to the 
statement: I believe my personal 
behavior has an influence on climate 
change? 
Do not agree 
Rather not agree 
Don’t know 
Rather agree 
Fully agree 
No answer 
9 
28 
19 
100 
41 
5 
4.46 
13.86 
9.41 
49.50 
20.30 
2.48 
26 To what extent do you agree to the 
statement: My behavior to evade climate 
change can encourage others in my 
environment to behave the same way? 
Do not agree 
Rather not agree 
Don’t know 
Rather agree 
Fully agree 
No answer 
7 
15 
28 
101 
48 
3 
3.47 
7.43 
13.86 
50.00 
23.76 
1.49 
26 To what extent do you agree to the 
statement: The government is solely 
responsible for measures against climate 
change? 
Do not agree 
Rather not agree 
Don’t know 
Rather agree 
Fully agree 
No answer 
95 
72 
10 
14 
7 
4 
47.03 
35.64 
4.95 
6.93 
3.47 
1.98 
26 To what extent do you agree to the 
statement: To mitigate climate change 
every German citizen should use as little 
electricity as possible? 
Do not agree 
Rather not agree 
Don’t know 
Rather agree 
Fully agree 
No answer 
5 
26 
33 
99 
35 
4 
2.48 
12.87 
16.34 
49.01 
17.33 
1.98 
26 To what extent do you agree to the 
statement: To mitigate climate change 
every German citizen should use their 
car as a means of transport as little as 
possible? 
Do not agree 
Rather not agree 
Don’t know 
Rather agree 
Fully agree 
No answer 
3 
25 
13 
94 
64 
3 
1.49 
12.38 
6.44 
46.53 
31.68 
1.49 
  
Σ
 202 100.00 
 
 
Table 8: Price appraisals 
# Variable State Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
27 Summary of the price 
estimations  
(for 1 unit = 100 kg CO2) 
< € 1 
€ 1 - € 2 
€ 2 - € 10 
€ 10 - € 100 
> € 100 
No answer 
39 
25 
66 
39 
20 
13 
19.31 
12.38 
32.67 
19.31 
9.90 
6.44 
28 How sure are you about your 
price estimation? 
I know it 
Sure 
Rather sure 
Rather unsure 
I don’t know, I guessed 
No answer 
4 
0 
5 
48 
135 
10 
1.98 
0.00 
2.48 
23.76 
66.83 
4.95 
29 Will you talk about this 
event and your behavior in it 
with your family, your 
friends or your colleagues? 
Yes 
No 
Don’t know 
No answer 
167 
5 
27 
3 
82.67 
2.48 
13.37 
1.49 
  
Σ
 202 100.00 
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Table 9: Buying motives of participants – part I 
# Variable State Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
30 I want to buy certificates, because 
I want to contribute to climate 
protection – regardless of what 
others do. 
Absolutely not applicable 
Rather not applicable 
Neutral 
Rather applicable 
Absolutely applicable 
No answer 
2 
3 
13 
48 
52 
1 
1.68 
2.52 
10.92 
40.34 
43.70 
0.84 
30 I want to buy certificates, because 
I think that others also contribute 
to climate protection. 
Absolutely not applicable 
Rather not applicable 
Neutral 
Rather applicable 
Absolutely applicable 
No answer 
11 
11 
30 
52 
14 
1 
9.24 
9.24 
25.21 
43.70 
11.76 
0.84 
30 I want to buy certificates, because 
especially people in poor 
countries will suffer from the 
consequences of climate change 
and I want to do something 
against it. 
Absolutely not applicable 
Rather not applicable 
Neutral 
Rather applicable 
Absolutely applicable 
No answer 
2 
11 
17 
56 
32 
1 
1.68 
9.24 
14.29 
47.06 
26.89 
0.84 
30 I want to buy certificates, because 
the industrialized countries, 
among them Germany, have 
played a decisive role in causing 
climate change. 
Absolutely not applicable 
Rather not applicable 
Neutral 
Rather applicable 
Absolutely applicable 
No answer 
3 
13 
25 
50 
26 
2 
2.52 
10.92 
21.01 
42.02 
21.85 
1.68 
30 I want to buy certificates, because 
future generations will suffer 
from the consequences of climate 
change and I want to do 
something against it. 
Absolutely not applicable 
Rather not applicable 
Neutral 
Rather applicable 
Absolutely applicable 
No answer 
2 
6 
11 
52 
46 
2 
1.68 
5.04 
9.24 
43.70 
38.66 
1.68 
30 I want to buy certificates, because 
the flora and fauna will suffer 
from the consequences. 
Absolutely not applicable 
Rather not applicable 
Neutral 
Rather applicable 
Absolutely applicable 
No answer 
4 
8 
16 
59 
31 
1 
3.36 
6.72 
13.45 
49.58 
26.05 
0.84 
  Σ  119 100.00 
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Table 10: Buying motives of participants – part II 
# Variable State Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
30 I want to buy certificates, because 
the government is not doing 
enough against climate change. 
Absolutely not applicable 
Rather not applicable 
Neutral 
Rather applicable 
Absolutely applicable 
No answer 
5 
23 
32 
35 
23 
1 
4.20 
19.33 
26.89 
29.41 
19.33 
0.84 
30 I want to buy certificates, because 
my environment (family, friends, 
colleagues) expect me to. 
Absolutely not applicable 
Rather not applicable 
Neutral 
Rather applicable 
Absolutely applicable 
No answer 
53 
32 
20 
12 
1 
1 
44.54 
26.89 
16.81 
10.08 
0.84 
0.84 
30 I want to buy certificates, because 
the organizers of this event expect 
me to. 
Absolutely not applicable 
Rather not applicable 
Neutral 
Rather applicable 
Absolutely applicable 
No answer 
76 
16 
19 
6 
1 
1 
63.87 
13.45 
15.97 
5.04 
0.84 
0.84 
30 I want to buy certificates, because 
it is my moral obligation. 
Absolutely not applicable 
Rather not applicable 
Neutral 
Rather applicable 
Absolutely applicable 
No answer 
23 
12 
25 
48 
10 
1 
19.33 
10.08 
21.01 
40.34 
8.40 
0.84 
30 I want to buy certificates, because 
it is important to protect the 
creation. 
Absolutely not applicable 
Rather not applicable 
Neutral 
Rather applicable 
Absolutely applicable 
No answer 
16 
14 
36 
36 
16 
1 
13.45 
11.76 
30.25 
30.25 
13.45 
0.84 
  Σ  119 100.00 
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Table 11: Refusing motives of participants 
# Variable State Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
31 I do not want to buy certificates, 
because I do not think that my 
buying of certificates will actually 
reduce emissions in Europe. 
Absolutely not applicable 
Rather not applicable 
Neutral 
Rather applicable 
Absolutely applicable 
No answer 
7 
4 
3 
23 
20 
26 
8.43 
4.82 
3.61 
27.71 
24.10 
31.33 
31 I do not want to buy certificates, 
because a market for certificates 
does not work. We need official 
prohibitions and commands. 
Absolutely not applicable 
Rather not applicable 
Neutral 
Rather applicable 
Absolutely applicable 
No answer 
5 
6 
8 
22 
12 
30 
6.02 
7.23 
9.64 
26.51 
14.46 
36.14 
31 I do not want to buy certificates, 
because I already act in a climate 
conscious way. 
Absolutely not applicable 
Rather not applicable 
Neutral 
Rather applicable 
Absolutely applicable 
No answer 
1 
3 
14 
18 
17 
30 
1.20 
3.61 
16.87 
21.69 
20.48 
36.14 
31 I do not want to buy certificates, 
because emissions trading 
anyhow suits the interests of the 
large scale industry only. 
Absolutely not applicable 
Rather not applicable 
Neutral 
Rather applicable 
Absolutely applicable 
No answer 
3 
10 
12 
24 
6 
28 
3.61 
12.05 
14.46 
28.92 
7.23 
33.73 
31 I do not want to buy certificates, 
because I think that emissions 
trading is principally unethical. 
Absolutely not applicable 
Rather not applicable 
Neutral 
Rather applicable 
Absolutely applicable 
No answer 
14 
8 
16 
12 
5 
28 
16.87 
9.64 
19.28 
14.46 
6.02 
33.73 
31 I do not want to buy certificates, 
because I would buy certificates 
from companies which have 
received them for free and by that 
subsidy them. 
Absolutely not applicable 
Rather not applicable 
Neutral 
Rather applicable 
Absolutely applicable 
No answer 
5 
9 
21 
14 
4 
30 
6.02 
10.84 
25.30 
16.87 
4.82 
36.14 
31 I do not want to buy certificates, 
because I do not trust ZEW. 
Absolutely not applicable 
Rather not applicable 
Neutral 
Rather applicable 
Absolutely applicable 
No answer 
29 
11 
8 
4 
2 
29 
34.94 
13.25 
9.64 
4.82 
2.41 
34.94 
31 I do not want to buy certificates, 
because I do not think that 
emissions can actually be 
measured and controlled. 
Absolutely not applicable 
Rather not applicable 
Neutral 
Rather applicable 
Absolutely applicable 
No answer 
12 
11 
15 
9 
6 
30 
14.46 
13.25 
18.07 
10.84 
7.23 
36.14 
  Σ  83 100.00 
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Annex II: Transcript of written instructions 
 
 
Instructions 
 
Welcome to the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim! 
 
Thank you for participating in this scientific survey about consumer decisions. In this file you will 
find all information you will need during the survey. During the event you will have the opportunity 
to return to the previous pages. But please do not read the upcoming pages unless we ask you to.  
Please follow the instructions attentively and please do not talk to the other participants.  
Please be assured that the data we collect today will only be used to compare results between groups 
of participants. We will not publish any individual data of the participants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ID: 1S1 
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Questionnaire I 
 
Please answer the following questions by ticking the according box or filling the blanks. 
 
General questions 
 
1. Please state your marital status: 
Married   O 
Unmarried with partner  O 
Single    O 
Other    O 
 
2. Please state your sex: 
Male    O 
Female    O 
 
3. Please state your age: __________ 
 
4. Are you a member of a religious community? 
Yes    O 
No    O 
 
5. How many children live in your household? (If you do not have any children please fill out all age 
groups with a 0) 
0-3 years __________ 
4-7 years  __________ 
8-12 years  __________ 
13-18 years  __________ 
Older than 18  __________ 
 
6. Please state the institution at which you have acquired your highest professional degree: 
University/University of Applied Sciences O 
Grammar School    O 
Intermediate School    O 
Secondary School    O 
None      O 
 
7. Please state your nationality of origin: 
German     O 
Turkish      O 
Russian     O 
Italian      O 
Other, (please state): _____________ 
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8. How much money is available in your household per month (net income)? 
Less than € 1,000  O 
€ 1,000 - € 2,000  O 
€ 2,000 - € 3,000  O 
€ 3,000 - € 4,000  O 
€ 4,000 - € 5,000  O 
More than € 5,000  O 
No comment   O 
 
9. If Sunday were Election Day, which party would you vote for? 
CDU/CSU – Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union O 
SPD – Social Democratic Party      O 
Alliance 90/ Green Party      O 
FDP – Free Liberal Party      O 
Die Linke – Left Party       O 
Others         O 
I do not vote.        O 
No comment        O 
 
10. Please state your professional occupation 
Employee   O 
Worker    O 
Unemployed   O 
Apprentice/Trainee  O 
Public officer   O 
Pupil    O 
Self-employed    O 
Student/ doctoral candidate  O 
   Retiree   O 
   Others   O 
 
11. Are you a member of an initiative or organisation promoting environmental protection? 
Yes O 
No O 
 
Climate Change Questions  
ZEW carries out research projects on climate change. Therefore, we would like to ask you to answer 
some questions on climate change. 
 
12. Please rate your level of information regarding climate change. I am… 
Very poorly 
informed 
Rather poorly 
informed 
Averagely informed Rather well 
informed 
Very well 
informed 
     
 
13. To what extent are you influenced by mass media (newspapers, TV, internet) regarding your 
perception of the consequences of climate change? 
Not at all 
influenced 
Rather not 
influenced 
Neutral Rather strongly 
influenced 
Very strongly 
influenced 
     
 
14. Are you concerned about climate change? 
Not at all 
concerned 
Rather not 
concerned 
Neutral Rather concerned Very concerned 
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15. Do you expect noticeable negative consequences of climate change for your personal life? 
Yes O 
No O 
 
16. Do you expect noticeable positive consequences of climate change for your personal life? 
Yes O 
No O 
 
17. To what extent do you think that climate change poses a serious threat to the respective areas? 
Area ↓ No serious 
threat 
Rather no 
serious 
threat 
Neutral Rather 
serious 
threat 
Very 
serious 
threat 
For me and my family      
For my children (if applicable)      
Future generations in general      
Friends, acquaintances, 
colleagues 
     
People in Germany in general      
People in other industrialised 
countries 
     
People in developing countries      
 
18. Have you been personally affected by negative effects of climate change? 
Yes O 
No  O  (if no, please proceed to question 21) 
 
19. If yes, which effects? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________ 
 
20. How strong were these negative effects for you personally? 
Very weak Rather weak Neutral Rather strong Very strong 
     
 
21. Have you been personally affected by positive effects of climate change? 
Yes O 
No O  (if no, please proceed to question 24) 
 
22. If yes, which effects? 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________ 
 
23. How strong were these positive effects for you personally? 
Very weak Rather weak Neutral Rather strong Very strong 
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24. When do you expect the impacts of climate change to become visible? 
Never In more than 
100 years 
Within the next 
100 years 
Within the next 
50 years 
Within the next 
10 years 
Already visible 
      
 
25. Do you think that there still is a need for commitment to fight climate change? 
Yes    O 
No    O 
Don’t know  O 
 
26. To which extent do you agree to the following statements? 
Statement↓ Do not 
agree 
Rather not 
agree 
Don’t 
know 
Rather 
agree 
Fully 
agree 
I believe my personal behavior has 
influence on climate change. 
     
My behavior to evade climate change 
can encourage others in my 
environment to behave the same way. 
     
The government is solely responsible 
for measures against climate change. 
     
To mitigate climate change every 
German citizen should use as little 
electricity as possible. 
     
To mitigate climate change every 
German citizen should use their car 
as a means of transport as little as 
possible. 
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General Information 
 
Today, we will offer you a certain product to purchase. In a few minutes you will learn which product 
it is and how the sale will be conducted. No one except for the ZEW team will learn about your 
statements from the event. 
 
As we want to assess how many units of the product you want to purchase, we would like to ask you 
not to talk to the other participants. 
Should you have any questions please signal us and we will come to you. 
 
The process of sale can be explained in three steps: 
 
1. Introduction of the product 
Before we ask you to make a purchase offer we will briefly introduce the product to you. 
 
2. Quantity you want to buy with different pricing 
You will receive a list with five prices for one unit of the product. You can state the quantity you 
want to purchase at the respective price. You can also state the quantity zero if you do not wish to 
purchase anything (there is no obligation to buy). At the end of the event you will draw one of the 
prices by lot. You will then buy the chosen quantity at the drawn price. 
 
3. Payment 
When leaving the room you will draw one price. You will then buy the quantity you have stated at 
this price. Please note: If you purchase the product, you have to use your own money (but: your 
expenditures cannot exceed € 40). 
Soon we will discuss a short example with you. 
 
Please note: 
With these rules of purchase it is in your own interest to state only the quantity you actually want 
to buy at the respective prices. Please state only truthful information. 
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Comprehension Test 
 
We will now carry out a short test to check if you have fully understood the rules of purchase. To 
answer the questions please fill in the blank or tick the box next to the question. Please signal if you 
have finished answering all questions and we will come to you. 
 
Please take a look to the statements in the following table. A participant has stated how many units of 
the product he wants to buy if the respective price is drawn.  
 
Please note:  
The maximum expenditures for each price are € 10 in this example. 
No. Price per 
unit 
How many units do I want to 
buy at this price? 
How many units can I buy 
in total at this price? 
Expenditures = 
Price x Units 
1 € 5.00 0 2 € 0.00 
2 € 4.00 0 2 € 0.00 
3 € 3.00 1 3 € 3.00 
4 € 1.00 3 10 € 3.00 
5 € 0.50 4 20 € 2.00 
 
Q: How many units will the participant buy if price no. 2 is drawn? 
______ units. 
 
Q: How many units will the participant buy if price no. 5 is drawn? 
______ units. 
 
Q: Which amount in Euros will the participant pay if price 3 is drawn? 
€ ______ . 
 
What do I have to do, if I do not want to purchase the product at a certain price? 
I state any quantity and hope that this price is not drawn   O 
I state the quantity zero.      O 
 
What do I have to do if I want to buy exactly three units of the product at a certain price? 
a) I state more than three units at this price.    O 
b) I state less than three units at this price.     O 
c) I state three units at this price.     O 
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Information on Climate Change 
 
Please read the information provided on this page. 
You have about 10 minutes to do so. 
 
Global climate change is seen as a serious environmental problem faced by mankind. The great 
majority of climate scientists expects the global average temperature to rise by 1.1 to 6.4 degrees 
Celsius until the year 2100. There is hardly any denial that mankind largely contributes to climate 
change by emitting greenhouse gases, especially carbon dioxide (CO2). CO2 originates from burning 
of fossil fuels like coal, oil or natural gas in industrial processes and energy production, or 
combustion engines of cars and lorries. CO2 is a global pollutant, i.e. each quantity unit of CO2 
emitted has the same effect on the climate regardless of the location where the emission has occurred. 
There are several consequences from rising temperatures. The most important consequences will be 
stated here:  
The sea level will rise by 18 to 59 cm worldwide until the year 2100. Low lying coastal regions may 
be threatened by floods.  
Extreme weather events like extreme heat waves, strong rainfalls and tropical storms are likely to 
become more frequent. 
Due to the shift of climate zones pathogens can spread to more northern areas than before. In 
southern Italy several cases of dengue fever were reported. Dengue fever is a dangerous infectious 
disease which usually occurs in tropical areas only. 
Climate change does not only have negative consequences, but also positive effects. The number of 
heat-related deaths might increase because of more frequent periods of heat. However, due to milder 
winters there will be a lower number of deaths by extreme cold. 
The consequences of climate change will vary regionally resulting in substantial consequences for 
agriculture. Countries in the south which today are already hot and dry will become even hotter and 
dryer. Especially African countries will have to expect lower crop yields. Countries in the north might 
profit from climate change. In Canada and the northern parts of the USA higher crop yields can be 
expected. 
Briefly summarised: in Germany the following effects can be expected: Until 2050 the mean 
temperature will rise by 1.25 to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Winters will become milder and more humid
and summers will be hotter and dryer.  
 
Sources used: 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
German Federal Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt)  
World Health Organization(WHO) 
 
 
 
40 
 
Information on European Emissions Trading  
 
Please read the information provided on this page. 
You will have about 10 minutes to do so.  
 
In 2005 the European Union has implemented the emissions trading system for carbon dioxide (CO2). 
Emissions trading is the central instrument of climate policy in Europe. It follows a simple principle: 
The European Commission, together with the member states, has determined the amount of CO2 to be 
emitted altogether in the respective sectors (energy production and energy intensive industries) until 
2020. This total amount will be distributed to the companies by the state in the form of emission 
rights (“permits”). For each quantity unit of CO2 emitted, the company has to give a permit to the 
state. The permits can be traded between companies.  
For each quantity unit of CO2 emitted e.g. by a power plant, the plant operator has to prove his 
permission to do so in the form of a permit. This leads to an important consequence: If the total 
amount of permits is reduced, the total emissions will be lower, simply because plant operators do 
not possess enough emission allowances. That means if a permit for one quantity unit is obtained 
from the market and is being “retired” (i.e. deleted) the total CO2emissions are reduced by exactly 
this quantity amount. The opportunity to retire permits actually exists in the framework of the EU 
Emissions Trading System. In Germany the German Emissions Trading Authority (DEHSt) regulates 
Emissions trading. The authority holds a retirement account with the account number DE-230-17-1. 
If permits are transferred to this account they will be withdrawn from circulation, i.e. deleted, by the 
end of each year.  
Emissions trading has one central advantage: It guarantees that the abatement of CO2 emissions 
occurs where it is the cheapest option. Companies with opportunities to abate carbon in a cost-
efficient way will sell their permits on the market, whereas companies with high abatement costs can 
acquire permits at a relatively low price. This trade is beneficiary for both sides and guarantees for the 
emission reduction target to be achieved at minimal costs.  
Altogether, European energy producers and energy intensive industries were allowed to emit about 
two billion tons of CO2 in the year 2009. As a benchmark: global CO2 emissions per year amount for 
29 billion tons of CO2. 
 
Summarising, it can be stated that if the total amount of permits in the EU Emissions Trading 
System is reduced, the total CO2 emissions in Europe decrease.  
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Purchase of CO2 Permits 
 
Explanation 
You are given the opportunity to buy permits of the EU Emissions Trading System at this event. 
ZEW will buy the amount of permits chosen and will retire them. Thus, you have the opportunity to 
contribute to the reduction of the actual CO2 emissions in Europe. 
 
The purchase of the permits will be attested by an independent body. The amount of permits 
purchased by each participant will be published on the ZEW website displaying the participant 
number (no names will be displayed). 
 
 
If you wish, ZEW will issue an official record about the amount of your permits  
purchased at the end of the event. 
 
  
 
Introduction of the product “CO2 permits”. 
One unit equals 100 kilograms of CO2 
 
Quantity you want to buy at each price. 
Please state in the table below the quantity of units (100 kg each) you are willing to buy at each price. 
When leaving the room you will draw by lot one of the five prices. You will then buy the quantity of 
units you have stated at this price.  
 
 
 
Important note: There is no obligation to buy! 
Permits purchased have to be paid! 
 
 
Please note: 
Your maximum expenditures for each price are € 40. 
The unit is 100 kg of CO2 
No. Price per 
unit 
How many units do I want to 
buy at this price? 
How many units can I buy 
in total at this price? 
Expenditures = 
Price x Units 
1 5.00 €  8  
2 2.00 €  20  
3 1.50 €  26  
4 1.00 €  40  
5 0.50 €  80  
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Questionnaire II 
 
Please fill in questionnaire II. 
 
27. Emission allowances of the European Emissions Trading System (certificates) are traded on the 
stock exchange. How would you estimate the price of such a permit on the stock exchange?  
 
100 kg of CO2 cost € _____. 
 
28. How sure are you about your estimation of question 27? 
I know it Sure Rather sure Rather unsure I don’t know, I guessed. 
     
 
29. Will you talk about this event and your behaviour in it with your family, your friends or your 
colleagues?  
a) Yes   O 
b) No    O 
c) I don’t know  O 
 
Please answer the following questions only if you want to buy permits. That means if you have stated 
a positive quantity (> 0) at any of the prices in the auction of the permits. 
 
30. I want to buy permits, because… 
Reason ↓ Absolutely 
not 
applicable 
Rather not 
applicable 
Neutral Rather 
applicable 
Absolutely 
not 
applicable 
…I want to contribute to climate 
protection – regardless of what 
others do. 
     
… I think that others also 
contribute to climate protection. 
     
… especially people in poor 
countries will suffer the 
consequences of climate change 
and I want to do something 
against it. 
     
… the industrialised countries, 
among them Germany, have 
played a decisive role in causing 
climate change. 
     
... future generations will suffer 
the consequences of climate 
change and I want to do 
something against it. 
     
… the flora and fauna will suffer 
the consequences. 
     
… the government is not doing 
enough against climate change. 
     
… my environment (family, 
friends, colleagues) expects me 
to. 
     
… the organisers of this event 
expect me to. 
     
… it is my moral obligation.      
… it is important to protect the 
creation. 
     
 
 
 
43 
 
31. I do not want to buy permits, because… 
Reason ↓ Absolutely 
not 
applicable 
Rather not 
applicable 
Neutral Rather 
applicable 
Absolutely 
not 
applicable 
… I do not think that my buying 
of permits will actually reduce 
emissions in Europe. 
     
… a market for permits does not 
work. We need official 
prohibitions and commands. 
     
… I already act in a climate 
conscious way. 
     
… emissions trading anyhow 
suits the interests of the large 
scale industry only.  
     
… I think that emissions trading 
is principally unethical.  
     
… I would buy permits from 
companies which have received 
them for free and by that subsidy 
them.  
     
… I do not trust ZEW.      
... I do not think that emissions 
can actually be measured and 
controlled. 
     
 
More reasons: ____________________________________________________ … 
 
 
 
Leaving the room 
 
Please leave the room only when we have asked you to. 
 
After leaving the room you will draw a price by lot and pay the certificates you have chosen to buy at 
this price.  
 
Thank you very much for participating! 
 
 
